Hybrid  Farmland Protection Programs: A New Paradigm for Growth Management by Thompson, Edward, Jr
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
Volume 23 | Issue 3 Article 6
"Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New
Paradigm for Growth Management
Edward Thompson Jr
Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmelpr
Repository Citation
Edward Thompson Jr, "Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New Paradigm for Growth
Management, 23 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 831 (1999), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmelpr/vol23/iss3/6
"HYBRID" FARMLAND PROTECTION PROGRAMS: A NEW
PARADIGM FOR GROWTH MANAGEMENT?
EDWARD THOMPSON, JR.*
Growth management has once again become a cause celebre.I
And, more than ever, one of the central challenges of growth management
is to protect vital natural resources from development. Chief among these
vital resources are the nation's farmlands. They supply our food;2 provide
environmental amenities like scenic open space, wildlife habitat and
unpaved watersheds;3 and demand few public services.4  If securely
protected, a perimeter of farmland can function as a "frame" for
community growth, deterring sprawl and encouraging efficient use of
suburban land and the revitalization of urban neighborhoods.
Securely protecting farmland-putting it legally out of the reach of
development for the foreseeable future-requires that we go beyond land
use regulations that are subject to political winds of change. It demands
that we confront the market economy and the issue of private property
rights to accommodate the interest of landowners in protecting the equity
in their real estate. The nation's most effective farmland protection
programs do this by marrying compensation and regulation-"carrots" and
"sticks"-in ways that enable the advantages of each to offset the
drawbacks of the other.
* Senior Vice President for Public Policy, American Farmland Trust. B.A., Government,
Cornell University; J.D. National Law Center, George Washington University; member
of the bars of Maryland, District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania. The author lives in a
village within Montgomery County's Agricultural Reserve and served as Chairman of the
county's Agricultural Preservation Advisory Board, which oversees its farmland
protection programs, from 1986 to 1997. He wishes to thank Jeremy Criss, Melissa
Cufiha Banach and all the others who generously assisted with this article.
' Cf HENRY L. DIAMOND & PATRICK F. NOONAN, LAND USE IN AMERICA 6-7 (1996)
(discussing the development of the modem land use movement in America).
2 One-half of the nation's total agricultural production (measured in dollar value),
including three-quarters of domestic fruits, vegetables and dairy products, comes from
metropolitan area counties. See A. SORENSEN ET AL., FARMING ON THE EDGE 5 (1997).
3 See generally AD HOC TASK FORCE ON AGRICULTURE AND NEW YORK CITY
WATERSHED REGULATIONS, POLICY GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS (1991) (on file with
author).
4 Cows don't go to school. See AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, THE COST OF COMMUNITY
SERVICES IN FREDERICK COUNTY MARYLAND 16 (1997).
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This article will begin in Part I by describing the traditional all-or-
nothing approach to farmland protection and the conflict that it has
engendered. Part II will then delve into the structure and function of one
of the most successful of the new hybrid programs, that of Montgomery
County, Maryland. Part III will put the Montgomery County approach
into the context of a new paradigm, not only for growth management, but
also for other environmental challenges facing our society. Part IV will
discuss the potential impact of the Takings Clause5 on this new paradigm.
Finally, Part V will conclude that the hybrid approach is really a
compromise between landowners and the general public, and consequently
is the most effective way to achieve farmland protection and other
important land use objectives.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Land as Property and a Resource
A fundamental tension confronts the management of growth and
development of land. Land is simultaneously a commodity that enjoys
legal privileges as private property, and a natural resource that is the
repository of public values. Attempts by government to limit the use of
private land for the public good cause these two principles to collide and
almost inevitably result in dissention, and often failure.6
When private property confronts resource protection, the core issue
being contested is who gains and who loses. Although the clash of
individual freedom and community values may also be implicated, it is
hard economics rather than fuzzy principles that most often seems to
animate opponents in the debate over the legitimacy of government
regulation of land. When land use is restricted, it imposes opportunity
costs-and sometimes genuine hardship-on private landowners.7 Is this
fair, if the public as a whole benefits? More and more landowners
disagree, insisting on just compensation from the public treasury as a right
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
6 See, e.g., John Echeverria, The Politics of Property Rights (visited Oct. 16, 1999)
<http://www.envpoly.org/papers/politics.htm> (analyzing property rights as political
issues).
7 See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) ("The
Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land").
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guaranteed by the Constitution. 8 If compensation is paid for such
"takings," as the courts increasingly require, 9 the taxpaying public must
bear the cost of resource protection-or of its abuse. But, leaving aside
the question of entitlement, can the public afford compensation and, if not,
does it mean that the quality of the environment and our communities
must inevitably decline as private wealth is aggrandized?
B. Polarization and Stalemate in Policymaking
These questions have come to preoccupy the legal and political
debate over growth management and resource protection generally. A
polarized "us versus them" mentality pervades. Environmentalists and
government regulators are aligned against those with a commercial
interest in land, with each side championing its own all-or-nothing
approach: regulation or compensation.10 There is little or no middle
ground.
The judicial system has reinforced this tendency with its emphasis
on adversarial proceedings and, in Takings Clause cases, with the notion
of a definitive, albeit indeterminate, threshold beyond which regulation
gives rise to a right of compensation.1 This polarity has spilled over into
8 "Nor shall private property be taken for public use without payment of just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of landowners' opinions
regarding compensation for takings, see infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
9 See generally, e.g., Lucas (requiring reimbursement of an owner for a "total taking" of
his land); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County,
Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that government action denying an owner all
beneficial use of his property was unconstitutional); Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (requiring a nexus between the purpose of the regulation
and the required exaction for a regulation to be constitutional); Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994) (enunciating test of "rough proportionality" between the burden on
the land and the public benefits anticipated).
'o Cf, e.g., The National Wildlife Federation, Takings: Where the NWF stands on the
105th Congress (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.nwf.org/nwf/lands/takings/
takI05.html> (arguing that regulation is needed to prevent industry from externalizing
costs to neighboring property, and analyzing how the 105th Congress voted on these
issues); Defenders of Property Rights, Protecting Your Rights in the Legislative Forum
(visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.defendersproprights.org/legis.htm> (arguing that
regulations create government takings of private property rights, and analyzing how the
105th Congress voted on these issues).
" "[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons." Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
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the political arena as the same advocates confront each other in the lobbies
of Congress, state legislatures, and county seats. The upshot has been
policy stalemate in the face of increasingly intense competition for, and
transformation of, the land.' 2 As the need for solutions becomes more
desperate, they seem farther out of reach.
C. Farmland Protection Programs. A New Paradigm?
A number of pioneering local jurisdictions have found an escape
from this dilemma by employing a mix of public policies that
accommodate property rights while securely protecting farmland.13 These
communities have rejected an all-or-nothing approach to growth
management, opting instead to combine regulation and compensation.' 4
As with any true hybrid, the respective strengths of each component tend
to neutralize the weaknesses of the other. Therein lies the success of this
approach.
Figure 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Farmland
Protection Methods and Policies
Incentives Regulations
"Carrots" "Sticks"
Examples Use value taxation Agricultural zoning
Agricultural districts Subdivision regulations
Purchase of easements Urban growth boundaries
Strengths ';VQE$1i - Low public cost
'Q2 ., ORY Quick
erman~entU ! .... Comprehensive
Weaknesses High public cost .r
Slow
Patchwork
Figure 1 illustrates the two basic methods used by these
jurisdictions to protect farmland, the respective strengths and weakness of
104, 124, quoted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015
(1992).
2 See Echevarria, supra note 6.
13 To see how different policies can be combined in varying degrees for different
outcomes see infra p.848, fig.4.
4 See FREEDGOOD ET AL., SAVING AMERICAN FARMLAND: WHAT WORKS 227, 257
(1997).
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these methods, and specific policy examples of each. 15  Incentives or
"carrots" generally involve payments, subsidies or preferences given to
landowners in exchange for voluntary compliance with rules limiting the
use of land. 16 Regulations or "sticks" are government mandates that
restrict land use without any monetary compensation of landowners.
17
The examples of each will be explained in the discussion of Montgomery
County in Part II. In either case, where the objective is to protect
farmland, the principal limitation or restriction must be on nonagricultural
development. Notice how each of the strengths of incentives and
weaknesses of regulations (shaded) are opposites, so that the former may
counteract the latter. Likewise, the strengths of regulations and
weaknesses of incentives (unshaded) are offsetting.' 8 The case of the
Montgomery County, Maryland farmland protection program serves as an
excellent illustration of how the principles embodied in this model can be
successfully applied in practice.
II. MONTGOMERY COUNTY: A MODEL OF THE NEW PARADIGM
Montgomery County, Maryland, has received more than its share
of notoriety for its transfer of development rights (TDR) program. '9 This
attention has obscured the fact that TDR is but one of many methods the
county has combined to protect farmland.20  No jurisdiction better
illustrates how carrots and sticks can be hybridized to securely protect
land as a resource while also accommodating private property rights.
Situated immediately northwest of Washington, D.C., Montgomery
County is a largely suburban community encompassing 496 square miles
15 These same basic approaches also apply to broader growth management strategies and
almost every other environmental challenge that requires limitations on land use.
16 See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 34.
17 See id. at 17. Landowners do share the benefits that conscientious land use regulations
secure, including, inter alia, lower public service costs and property taxes, and protection
of their ability to conduct agricultural operations without liability resulting from conflicts
with residential neighbors.
18 Italics in Figure 1 indicate characteristics that are generally of concern to public
officials, while CAPITALIZATION indicates those of most concern to private
landowners.
'9 See Stephen C. Fehr, Montgomery's Line of Defense Against the Suburban Invasion,
WASHINGTON POST, March 25, 1997, at Al. See also STANLEY SCHIFF, REAL WORLD
EXPERIENCE WITH TDRS-AN UPDATE 3 (discussing the Montgomery County, Maryland
program as a template for future farmland preservation programs).
20 See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 259.
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21(316,800 acres). It consistently ranks among the nation's most affluent
and well-educated jurisdictions, with little poverty, an excellent school
system and an economy grounded in biomedical, computer and
communications technology. 22 From approximately 510,000 in 1970,23 its
population grew to approximately 580,000 in 1980,24 when its farmland
protection program was inaugurated, and-far from being slowed by
growth management-reached 757,000 in 1990.25 During roughly the
same period, annual agricultural production in the county, dominated by
nursery crops and feed grains, grew from $10 million to $28 million, while
the number of farms decreased from 650 to 560.26 It is not an agricultural
powerhouse, but neither is its farm industry inconsequential.27 Though it
is demographically atypical, the land use challenges that have confronted
Montgomery County are proportionate to the advantages it enjoys, making
it a worthy model for other jurisdictions to examine.
A. The Use of "Sticks" in Montgomery County
The foundation of the Montgomery County model is an Agricultural
Reserve comprised of 90,000 acres of rural land where agriculture is the
preferred-not just permissible-use of land and residential development
is limited to a density of one dwelling per twenty-five acres.28 Established
pursuant to a 1980 master plan revision, this Reserve and its
21 See MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, WHERE BUSINESSES
Go To GROW 4-5 (1998).
22 See id. at 9-13.
23 See R. SCARFO ET AL., MONTGOMERY COUNTY AGRICULTURAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE, FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE STUDY FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND
56 (1995).
24 See id.
25 See U.S. Census Bureau, Montgomery County, Md. Population Statistics for 1990
(visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://www.census.gov>.
26 See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Census for Montgomery County,
Maryland (visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://govinfo.library.orst.edu/cgi-bin/ag-list?01-031.
mdc>.
27 Agriculture contributed an estimated $285 million to the county economy in 1998. See
MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PRESERVING OUR
AGRICULTURAL HERITAGE (1999).
28 See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § 59-C-9.41 (1998).
29 See MARYLAND NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION,
PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL OPEN SPACE, MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN (1980) [hereinafter FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN]. It is worth
noting that the rationale for creating the Reserve was not only to protect agriculture and
open space, but also to concentrate development within an area where it would be
[Vol. 23:831
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accompanying zoning were necessary to prevent further suburban
encroachment into the county's agricultural area, where agricultural use
value tax assessment 30 and five-acre large-lot zoning had both failed to
curb sprawl. 31 The boundaries of the Reserve, essentially an urban limit
line, were carefully chosen, tending to follow natural features like stream
valleys where "greenway" parks were eventually acquired to separate
developed and agricultural areas. Where no natural features exist,
developable land immediately outside the Reserve is zoned for low-
density rural residential use as a buffer.
32
Remarkably, almost no farmland in the Reserve has been rezoned
from agricultural to other uses in the two decades since the Reserve was
established.33 One reason is that, to accommodate future growth, the
Reserve originally excluded about 30,000 acres of rural land,"4 of which
22,000 still remain undeveloped. 35 Thus, there has been little justification
for rezoning and county officials have been steadfast in refusing it.
36
Another is that state law, which is generally very supportive of county
land use authority, 37 provides that the zoning on land annexed by
municipalities may not be changed for five years. This, coupled with the
fact that there are only a few, small incorporated towns in the Reserve,
appears to have helped curb speculation. Finally, county infrastructure
accessible to public transit and could be inexpensively serviced. See id. at 29. The
Montgomery County plan, thus, applied the tenets of what is now called "smart growth."
30 Use value assessment, one of the "carrots" listed in Figure 1, is in common use
throughout the U.S. See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 145. To prevent a heavy property
tax burden from forcing or encouraging farmers to sell land for development, it bases
their ad valorem taxes on the value of land for agricultural production rather than its
"highest and best use." In rapidly growing areas, the latter can be many times greater,
explaining why, in the absence of other incentives or regulations, use value assessment
usually forestalls development only as long as farmers want to keep farming.
31 See FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 12.
32 See id. at 40-42.
33 See Telephone Interview with Melissa Cufiha Banach, Chief, Strategic Planning
Branch, Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission (Sept. 30, 1999)
[hereinafter Cufiha Banach Interview].
34 See FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 29, at 36.
35 See Telephone Interview with Jeremy Criss, Agricultural Services Division Manager,
Montgomery County Office of Economic Development (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter
Criss Interview].
36 See Cufiha Banach Interview, supra note 33.
37 Montgomery County's government includes an elected executive and nine-member
county council with broad legislative powers. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 25 § 1.
Incorporated municipalities have home rule and annexation powers under Maryland law.
See id. art. 25 §§ 9-19. Local officials in Maryland, however, do not play as important a
role in land use as they do in the Northeastern and Great Lakes states.
1999]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
policy discourages subdivision on a scale that would interfere with
agriculture. No public water and sewer services have been extended, nor
are they planned in the Reserve; 38 and Montgomery's regulation of new
wells and septic systems tends to be more stringent than in neighboring
jurisdictions. 39 These policies have also minimized the land price inflation
that typically occurs when public investments in infrastructure are
capitalized into land values; this has important implications for the
ultimate cost of farnland protection.4 '
Figure 2. Map of Montgomery County Showing Farmland Protected
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38 See Cufiha Banach Interview, supra note 33.
39 See R. SCARFO ET AL., supra note 23, at 23 (1995).
40 For example, construction of a 24-mile segment of Georgia Highway 316 increased the
value of adjacent farmland by $355 million. See J. BERGSTROM, ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF
GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON THE LOCATION AND TYPE OF DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY
OF THE GREATER METROPOLITAN ATLANTA AREA 55 (1998).
41 See EDWARD THOMPSON, JR., SHARING THE RESPONSIBILITY: WHAT AGRICULTURAL
LANDOWNERS THINK ABOUT PROPERTY RIGHTS, GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 13 (1998).
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The foregoing package of regulations illustrates the strengths and
weaknesses of the "sticks" in our farmland protection policy model. The
restrictive zoning was quickly established with the stroke of a legislative
pen over a large expanse of land, providing comprehensive protection
against development that could supplant or conflict with agriculture. This
protection cost the public almost nothing. On the other hand, it cost
owners of farmland in the Reserve plenty, as the development potential of
their land was reduced by as much as eighty percent by eliminating four
out of five potential building lots. 42 Moreover, this arguably confiscatory
result was compelled by the government against the wishes of landowners.
These drawbacks of Montgomery County's regulation of farmland
caused many landowners to oppose it, 43 just as today some oppose
virtually any kind of land use regulation as a "taking" of property rights.44
Another weakness of agricultural zoning, and of almost all other kinds of
regulation, is that it can be changed or repealed just as easily as it was
adopted. The temporary nature of regulation to protect agriculture is
especially problematic because the enterprise of farming is uncertain
enough without the constant risk that changes in surrounding land use
could render ordinary agricultural practices nuisance-like.45 Indeed, the
term "impermanence syndrome ' 46 aptly describes the myriad, mutually
reinforcing problems associated with farming in the shadow of suburbs
that can sprawl without end: development of nearby farms, increased
vandalism of crops and equipment, greater threat of liability, higher
insurance premiums, more downtime, higher production costs, lower crop
yields, higher stress levels, lower net farm income, failure to invest in
42 This theoretical reduction probably exaggerates the actual impact, since the
development potential of much of the rural land in Montgomery County is limited by
poor septic suitability and steep slopes. See FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN, supra note 29,
at 18.
41 See Richard E. Tustian, Preserving Farming Through Transferable Development
Rights, AM. LAND F. MAG., Summer 1983, at 63.
44 See, e.g., Defenders of Property Rights, About Us (visited Oct. 16, 1999) <http://www.
defendersproprights.org/inf-about.htm> ("In too many cases, over-zealous bureaucrats
join with well-funded extreme environmentalists to extend the reach of laws and
regulations to take away the productive use of a piece of property-without any just
compensation for the property owner. Too often, the Courts have allowed this to happen,
or even broadened the authority of government.").
45 See Edward Thompson, Jr, Right to Farm Laws, in 1983 ZONING & PLANNING LAW
HANDBOOK 207, 207 (Frederic A. Strom ed., 1983).
46 FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 13.
1999]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
farm upkeep and improvements, increased pressure to sell farms for
development, and so on.47
B. Montgomery County's "Carrots"
At the time Montgomery County created its Agricultural Reserve,
it also took a bold step to ameliorate the foregoing weaknesses of a
strictly-regulatory approach to farmland protection: it established a
transfer of development rights ("TDR") program.4 8  Landowners in the
Reserve, termed the "TDR sending area," were awarded one
"development right" for each five-acre building lot they could have
developed under the old zoning rules.4 9 These development rights can be
applied to land in the Reserve to allow residential development at the new
permitted density of one unit per twenty-five acres, or they can be sold and
transferred to designated parcels of land within the county's development
envelope, called the "TDR receiving area." 50 If transferred, TDRs entitle
the purchaser to increase the number of houses that may be built on
residentially zoned land, subject to county planning commission approval
of specific receiving parcels and the increased lot yield.51
47 See Edward Thompson, Jr., Case Studies in Suburban-Agricultural Land Use Conflict,
in 1982 ZONING & PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 297, 297-313 (Frederic A. Strom ed.,
1982).
48 See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE §§ 59-C-9.6 to .8; FUNCTIONAL MASTER
PLAN, supra note 29, at 41. This "carrot" helped sell at least some landowners on the
"stick" of regulation, enlarging the constituency for its adoption-an important lesson for
those contemplating such programs. See Tustian, supra note 43, at 63.49 See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § 59-C-9.6. An example of how Montgomery
County attempted to accommodate rural landowners that were disappointed by
downzoning is that TDRs were allocated without regard to physical limitations of the
land that could have prevented its development. See id.
50 See id. § 59-A-6.1. When any of the development rights associated with a sending
parcel are sold, a perpetual conservation easement is recorded on that land, limiting its
development to one dwelling for each TDR retained by the landowner, not to exceed the
maximum permissible density of one unit per twenty-five acres. See id. at § 59-A-6. 1(j).
" See id. at § 59-A-6.1 (h). Typically, county planners approve only marginal increases in
lot yield, e.g., five or six single family detached dwellings per acre where four would
have been permitted without TDR transfer,. or 18 townhouse units where 15 were
formerly allowed. See Cuftha Banach Interview, supra note 33. In fact, TDR transfers
have not substantially increased the residential density of any of the county's 20 local
planning areas. See id. Nonetheless, opposition from neighbors of potential receiving
areas to increased density has been one of the principal obstacles faced by Montgomery
officials as they implement the TDR program. At one point, a NIMBY lawsuit halted the
TDR program on a technicality, necessitating that the county council reauthorize it. See
West Montgomery County Citizens Assn. v. Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Comm., No. 124 (Md. Apr. 1, 1987). The Agricultural Reserve and TDR
840 [Vol. 23:831
"HYBRID" FARMLAND PROTECTION PROGRAMS
The TDR program provided significant compensation to
landowners whose property was reduced in value by downzoning within
the Reserve. Initially, TDRs sold for about $3,500 apiece or, at five acres
per TDR, about $700 per acre. 52 The market price of TDRs increased to a
peak of $11,000 in 1996 but has declined to about $8,000 in 1999. 5' The
increase in the market value of TDRs is attributable partly to a decrease in
the supply of available TDRs relative to demand-the price is strictly a
market function, not unlike that of securities-and partly to the fact that
the county began a purchase of development rights ("PDR") program in
1987 that offers landowners a competing method of receiving
compensation that put a floor under TDR prices. 54 Under Montgomery
County's PDR program, participating landowners must sell all their
development rights for a price determined by a formula and a competitive
bidding system in which landowners may improve their chances of selling
program has survived other legal challenges as well. See, e.g., Dufour v. Montgomery
County Council, Law No. 56964 (Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Md. Jan. 20,
1983) (seeking to strike the program as a government taking).
52 See Criss Interview, supra note 35. This price was well below the former development
value of Reserve land, causing some landowners to complain, but several nuances of the
TDR scheme increase the actual return to landowners. First, TDR prices do not depend
on the quality of the land from which they are transferred. Thus, land that has little or no
development value because it is too steep, rocky, wet or flood-prone to develop, or has
other disabilities like overhead power lines, receives a windfall from the sale of TDRs.
Second, every fifth TDR-which most landowners retain so they have the option of
developing their land at one unit per 25 acres, and which is far more valuable than the
other four-determines the market price when sold by landowners. Today, a 25-acre
farm parcel with one TDR attached, allowing a new house to be built, sells for around
$300,000 or $12,000 per acre, while a similar parcel without any development potential
might go for around $35,000 or $1,500 per acre. See Telephone Interview with Franklin
Jamison, Representative of Charles H. Jamison Realty Co. (October 10, 1999). The "fifth
TDR" is therefore worth about $10,600 per acre! This also explains why Montgomery
County is now experiencing an increase in "farmette" development in the Reserve.
53 See Criss Interview, supra note 35.
54 In fact, the average price of TDRs doubled within three years of the inauguration of
Montgomery's PDR program. The formula used to determine PDR prices, as laid out in
Montgomery County, Md. Exec. Reg. 66-91, effectively raised the minimum price at
which farmers were willing to sell TDRs because owners of almost any land in the TDR
sending area could now sell development rights to the county as well as developers. The
PDR program originally did not allow the rights purchased by the county to be
transferred, because that would have detracted from the goal of increasing TDR prices-
which was an explicit purpose of the new PDR program-by diluting the effect that
removing TDRs from the market had on their price. After TDR prices rose, the county
changed its law in 1992 to bank the rights acquired by PDR. See Montgomery County,
Md. Exec. Reg. 66-91. This preserved the option to sell them to raise additional money
for the program. Opposition of farmers, however, was still strong enough to defer a
decision to allow their actual-sale and transfer.
19991
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by reducing their asking price. The current price ranges from about $1,500
to $4,500 per acre. 55 As with the sale of TDRs, a perpetual conservation
easement is recorded over the property, restricting nonagricultural uses. 56
A combination of real estate transfer tax proceeds and annual county
appropriations has generated about $18 million to fund the PDR
program.
57
Together, the Montgomery TDR and PDR programs, along with a
58similar state PDR program, have encouraged landowners to place
55 See Criss Interview, supra note 35. The formula results in payment of higher prices to
protect those farms that the county deems of greatest importance in terms of agricultural
production and growth management objectives. See Montgomery County, Md. Exec.
Reg. 66-9 1. Thus large tracts with highly fertile soils close to the urban limit line, owned
by long-tenured commercial farmers, receive a preference over small hobby farms with
poor soils remote from development pressure. See Criss Interview, supra note 35.
Montgomery County was the first jurisdiction to substitute a formula for the more
traditional real estate appraisal method of valuing conservation easements. See id. In
contrast to appraisals, the formula approach is quicker and less expensive for both
purchaser and seller, and it allows the county to target highly desirable farms in a way
that appraisals simply cannot. See id. Indeed, appraisals using the "before and after"
method of determining easement value typically award higher prices to smaller parcels
with low agricultural productivity than to larger, more productive farms. See id. To
assure that average easement prices do not exceed market value, the county does use
appraisals to benchmark its formula. See id. Landowners may, at their own expense, rely
on an appraisal to determine an offering price for their easements, but the county will not
pay more than 25% above the formula value. See id.
See MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD. CODE § 59-C-2.442 (1997). The terms of PDR
easements, modeled after a similar Maryland State program, discussed infra, note 58,
allow them to be extinguished after a 25-year period if a landowner can demonstrate that
the conservation purpose of the easement is no longer served and if the current market
value of the development rights is repaid. Montgomery County's easement also allows
sellers to create one building lot for each of their children, subject to the 25-acre
minimum density requirement and to county approval of lot size and location, based on
criteria intended to minimize the conversion of farmland and interference with
agricultural operations.
5' See MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MONTGOMERY
COUNTY AGRICULTURAL EASEMENT PROGRAM, ACTUAL EXPENSES FOR PRE-FY 1989-
1999 (1999).
58 MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. §§ 2-501 to -515. Established in 1979, the state program, run
by the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, is the leading farmland PDR
program in the U.S., having protected 152,000 acres of farmland at a cost of $177 million
as of 1998. See MARYLAND AGRICULTURAL LAND PRESERVATION FOUNDATION,
ANNUAL REPORT 1998 37 (1998). A threshold for eligibility to sell easements under the
state program is enrollment in an "agricultural district." Use of agricultural districts is
seen a "carrot" rather than a "stick." See supra fig.l. Several states authorize these
districts, wherein landowners agree to temporary restrictions on development of their
land in exchange for government benefits such as tax abatement, protection against
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perpetual conservation easements on almost 50,000 acres of farmland in
the county's Reserve.59 This is more acreage and a greater percentage-
sixty-five percent of all private land in the Reserve-than any other local
jurisdiction in the country.60 A total of about $20 million in public tax
dollars, and an estimated $60 million paid for TDRs by developers, have
been invested to acquire these easements. 61 This investment in "carrots"
has ameliorated or eliminated the weaknesses of the county's farmland
protection regulations.
In contrast to the Reserve's restrictive zoning, easement sales are
strictly voluntary on the part of landowners and, of course, compensate
them, at least to some extent, for the property value they lost when their
land was downzoned. Just as importantly, the limitations they place on
nonagricultural development are about as permanent and inviolate as
contemporary property law permits, 62 offering a remedy, if not a total
cure, for the impermanence syndrome. Changes in zoning alone cannot
restore the right to develop farmland under easements, which are held
under a public trust. 63 So, as a matter of law, the stability of agricultural
land use in Montgomery's Reserve is largely above the politics of land use
that tend to undermine farmland protection programs relying strictly on
statutory regulation. But the political calculus, too, has been
fundamentally altered by the acquisition of easements over such a high
proportion of farms in the Reserve: a majority of landowners, having
voluntarily relinquished most if not all of their development rights, now
eminent domain and, like Maryland, eligibility to sell easements. See FREEDGOOD, supra
note 14, at 195.
59 See MONTGOMERY COUNTY OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PRESERVING OUR
AGRICULTURAL HERITAGE (1999).
60 See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 87. See also, Farmland Information Center,
American Farmland Trust, Local Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easement
Programs (visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://farm.fic.niu.edu/fic-ta/tafs-paceloc.htrnl>
(providing a table summary of local PACE programs in numerous states, including
Montgomery County, Maryland).
61 See Criss Interview, supra note 35. This investment has undoubtedly bolstered the
local agricultural economy as well as compensated landowners for property rights. Cf,
ROBIN L. SHERMAN, ET AL., INVESTING IN THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE: THE
MASSACHUSETTS FARMLAND PROTECTION PROGRAM AND THE PERMANENCE SYNDROME
23-32 (1997) (discussing the types farm improvements that farmers made with the money
generated from the sale of TDRs).
62 These and all other conservation easements remain subject to eminent domain powers,
though a strong overriding purpose would be necessary to summon the political will to
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have a vested interest in the new low-density status quo, rather than in
relaxing the zoning to permit sprawling subdivisions.
64
III. THE NEW PARADIGM
A. Are "Carrots " Alone Sufficient to Protect Farmland from Sprawl?
The strengths of voluntary, compensatory, permanent easement
acquisition programs-particularly from the viewpoint of landowners-
make it tempting to rely on them alone to protect farmland. Many
jurisdictions have done so. 65 But to do so raises questions about their
weaknesses and whether complementary regulatory policies are needed to
offset them, as in the case of Montgomery County.
First and foremost, the purchase of easements is expensive. Even
if landowners discount the price, which they often do; even if government
can accelerate purchases by debt-financing;6 6 and even if the cost is
shifted to the private sector through TDRs; there remains serious doubt
64 Nevertheless, several issues perpetuate some concern about the future of Montgomery
County agriculture among farmers and other residents of the Reserve. One is industrial
siting policy. The open space preserved by the county was deemed attractive, both
physically and politically-the Reserve contains only about five percent of the county's
voters-as a location for a county landfill, trash incinerator and a new jail. Another is a
proposed "Outer Beltway" around Washington, D.C. One alternative route for this
circumferential highway would cut through the heart of the Montgomery Agricultural
Reserve, including about 20 farms under conservation easement. Both Montgomery
County and Maryland state officials oppose this route-which is favored mainly by
Virginia politicians and developers to relieve traffic congestion caused by that state's
relatively lax land use policies-because of its potential sprawl-inducing impact on the
Reserve. These threats demonstrate that there is no sure cure for impermanence, only the
necessity for continuing vigilance.
65 See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 86.
66 A number of states have used bonded indebtedness to finance easement acquisitions.
See id. Howard County, Maryland for example, has used what is perhaps the most
innovative leveraging scheme to acquire easements at roughly half their market value:
"securitizable" purchase contracts that generate tax-free income for sellers and can be
sold like bonds for a return of principal. See id. at 262-65. However, because easements
must compete with zoning that allows development on three-acre lots throughout its
agricultural area, the market value of easements in Howard is nearly twice as high as in
adjacent Montgomery County. See id. This is a vivid illustration of how relying on
"carrots" alone is not as effective as a hybrid approach to farmland protection.
67 Despite the potential of TDRs to reduce the public cost of easement acquisition, no
jurisdiction has come close to protecting as much farmland with them as Montgomery
County. See id. at 123. The probable explanation is that the essential conditions for a
successful TDR program have been missing in other jurisdictions. These include: a
vigorous economy producing significant demand for new housing; a large, sophisticated
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that, in any given jurisdiction, easement purchases alone can restrict
development quickly enough over a large enough area to make a
significant difference in directing and managing growth.
This underscores the other major weaknesses of easement
purchases and other incentive programs: they are notoriously slow,
resulting in at best a patchwork of land protection, at least in the short run.
Indeed, the local jurisdiction that has come closest to Montgomery
County's achievement, Carroll County, Maryland, has protected only a
small fraction of its agricultural protection area after twenty years of
purchasing easements.68 The state of Maryland, whose easement purchase
program leads the nation,69 has lost two acres of farmland for every one it
has protected; 70 and most states and localities that have PDR programs lag
far behind this pace. Only where development pressure is not strong
enough to pose a major threat to agriculture does it appear that easements
alone can be relied on to protect farmland and farming against the prospect
of future sprawl. 71 As the experience of Montgomery County and of a
handful of other local jurisdictions seems to demonstrate, in any
community where sprawl is visible on the horizon, effective land use
regulations must be adopted to buy time for incentives to provide more
permanent farmland protection. Incentives, in turn, can help promote the
adoption of such regulations by offering landowners the prospect of
compensation for the effect that regulations may have on their property
values. As more and more land is permanently protected by conservation
easements, an increasing number of landowners will have a vested interest
in maintaining the regulations, thus diminishing the risk that it will be
changed and undermine the entire farmland protection scheme.
B. Hybridization: What Mix of Carrots and Sticks?
In the ideal "hybrid" growth management program, regulations
will be strong enough to hold the line against sprawl and, thus, buy time
planning department to administer TDRs' complexities; and, above all, the political will
to impose strict, very low-density zoning on an extensive area of farmland and, just as
importantly, to resist the inevitable pressure for rezoning.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 86.
70 See MARYLAND AGRICULTURAL LAND PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 58, at
39.
71 Exceptions may be communities where the land is controlled by a few owners whose
farming operations are profitable and stable, particularly if these owners or other
members of the community have significant non-farm wealth that allows them to donate
easements or to finance easement purchases.
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for incentives like easement purchases to provide more permanent
protection of farmland and open space, while compensating landowners
for lost equity. On the other hand, the level of public investment in
incentives will be sufficient to convince landowners that their equity
concerns will be addressed in a timely manner; and that adequate funds
will be available to fairly compensate them when their individual
circumstances give rise to the need to recover the equity in their property.
It is important to note that this need will arise at different times for
every landowner. For example, a farmer who has unexpected expenses or
a debt coming due may need to cash out almost immediately. A young
farmer who plans to expand in a few years may look to the sale of an
easement to finance the purchase of additional land. Another, like a
producer who wants to pass the farm along to one of her children, may
include the sale of an easement in her estate plan to provide cash for
siblings who will not inherit the land. The very significant implication is
that the total cost of purchasing easements over all the farmland in a
designated protection zone is not as important as theflow of annual funds
required to keep faith with landowners by meeting their need for equity
redemption in a timely manner.72
Montgomery County's hybrid program did not initially set a goal
for the annual purchase of easements or the transfer of development
rights. 73 Shortly after the PDR program was established, though, county
officials determined that a target was needed to help raise a predictable,
adequate amount of annual funding, so that the agricultural community
could be assured that the program would, in fact, meet their needs in the
future.74 Since proceeds from the state real estate transfer tax could not be
counted on to provide a regular stream of funding, other sources would
have to be tapped, such as appropriations from the county council.
To establish a farmland protection goal and PDR funding target,
the county's Agricultural Preservation Advisory Board-comprised
mostly of farmers-looked at several trends: the number of landowners
72 In Montgomery County, landowners that apply to sell easements typically have to wait
a year or two before their offers are accepted and payment is made. This seems to be a
reasonable planning horizon for landowners to accept, given the complexity of real estate
transactions and the amount of money involved. However, among all state and local
jurisdictions with PDR programs, the wait to sell easements averages about six years.
See EDWARD THOMPSON, JR., WINNING FRIENDS, LOSING GROUND: STATE AND LOCAL
COMMUNITIES NEED A FEDERAL PARTNER TO PROTECT THE NATION'S FARMLAND 6
(1995). This may compromise the ability of these PDR programs to make a good faith
offer to compensate landowners in a timely manner.
73 See Criss Interview, supra note 35.
" See id.
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who annually offered to sell easements, the estimated cost of easements,
the average rate of TDR transfers, and the rate of farmland development.
75
Balancing all these factors, the Board established a goal of protecting all
71,000 acres of privately owned, undeveloped farmland in the Reserve by
the year 2006. With TDRs protecting approximately 2,000 to 2,500 acres
per year, this would entail funding the PDR program at the rate of about
$2 million per year to protect 600 additional acres of the highest-quality
farmland at an average cost of more than $3,000 per acre. At the time the
goal was achieved, there would remain a "cushion" of about 10,000 acres
of undeveloped farmland outside the Reserve.
Figure 3. Montgomery County Trends and PDR Funding Goal
2On
The broader significance of the method used by Montgomery County to
establish its farmland protection goal (see Figure 3) is that it can be used
to evaluate options for combining regulation and incentives in hybrid
programs to protect farmland and achieve more comprehensive growth
management objectives. Figure 4 shows a comparison of two options-
one more reliant on "carrots," the other depending more on "sticks"-in a
hypothetical jurisdiction. It sheds further light on the relationship between
" See id.
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these approaches and its effect on how landowners and the public share
the cost of achieving desirable land uses.
Figure 4. Hypothetical Model Showing Options for
Combining "Carrots" and "Sticks"
123
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Our hypothetical jurisdiction has established a goal of protecting
50,000 acres of farmland, half of what it started with. The first option for
achieving this goal assumes that 5,000 acres of farmland will be developed
annually (line Dl), reflecting few if any restrictions on development.
Under this scenario, about 5,000 acres of land must be protected by PDR
easements each year (line P1) or the jurisdiction's goal cannot be met
within the ten years that it will take for development to consume all but
50,000 acres of farmland. If the purchase of easements costs, say, $1,500
per acre, the annual public cost of this approach would be $7.5 million.
But what if the jurisdiction simply cannot afford to spend that
much money? What if the public is willing to spend only $4.5 million a
year on PDR, achieving a rate of protection illustrated by line P2? If
development proceeds at the same pace (extension of line DI), the
jurisdiction would protect only about 37,000 acres of farmland by the
twelfth year, when development will have consumed all but that amount of
land. To meet the 50,000 acre goal, a second option would be to
strengthen the restrictions on development, slowing its rate to, assume,
3,000 acres per year (line D2). This would buy sufficient time-an
additional five years-for a PDR program funded at $4.5 million to meet
the goal by protecting 3,000 acres a year (line P2). Significantly, under
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either option, all owners of farmland receive compensation for their
property rights, whether by gelling their land for development or being
paid for conservation easements.
In applying this method to an actual jurisdiction, the level of
annual funding and the period of time it takes to accommodate the
property rights of landowners should reflect the reasonable expectations of
the farm community for compensation. If in any given year a certain
number of farms change hands or otherwise find it necessary to recoup the
equity in their land, the goal of a PDR program should be to accommodate
these landowners and, thus, keep faith within the farm community by
"being there" when needed. On the other hand, with the knowledge that
only a certain amount of funding will be available for this purpose-
provided the amount is not simply a token-members of the farm
community should be able to adjust their expectations and plan their
finances accordingly. In the end, landowners must believe they are being
treated fairly.
76
C. Prospects for Broader Application of the "Hybrid" Approach
Can the "hybrid" approach to growth management help us escape
the polarization that now characterizes the debate over land as both private
property and a public resource? Does it have broader application than
farmland protection? That depends on the willingness of the public to pay
for financial incentives to landowners, and on the willingness of private
property owners to abide by regulations without demanding excessive
compensation. On this score, the evidence suggests that both are moving
in the direction of accommodating the others' interests.
76 This does not necessarily mean that they will or should receive as much compensation
as if they had been allowed to develop their land to its so-called "highest and best use."
The imposition of land use regulations will almost certainly reduce land values and,
hence, the per acre compensation for conservation easements based on the appraisal
method. Viewed from a public perspective, it could be said that regulations recapture
some of the windfall conferred on property owners by public infrastructure investments
and the like, maintaining a rough sense of fairness. Indeed, most landowners seem to
recognize that the "highest and best use" value of their property is attributable at least in
part to public investment and other taxpayer-funded subsidies and preferences; and, as a
result, believe that just compensation for relinquishing development rights may be
something less than this value. See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 13. Reinforcing this
conclusion is the fact that many farmland PDR programs have on average paid less than
fair market value for conservation easements. It should be further noted, however, that if
deemed necessary to ensure fairness, a formula approach to easement valuation, such as
Montgomery County's, could be used to set easement prices that reflect pre-regulation
land values.
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Figure 5. Other Leading Local Farmland Protection Programs n
Agricultural Acres Farmland Amount
Jurisdiction Zoning Zoned for Acres Under Invested in
Density Agriculture Easement Easements
Baltimore County, MD 1:50 acres 139,000 13,600 $36.0 M
Carroll County, MD 1:20 acres 191,000 39,348 $29.8 M
Lancaster County, PA 1:25 acres 270,000 32,000 $43.3 M
Marin County, CA 1:60 acres 118,600 20,747 $17.4 M
Sonoma County, CA's 1:/10-320 ac 80,770" 19,770 $25.0 M
Montgomery County is not alone as an example of a farmland
protection program that has deliberately combined regulatory and
incentive-based approaches. Indeed, those local programs that have
protected the most farmland, while successfully resisting the
encroachment of development, all appear to fit the same basic model as
Montgomery County. Figure 5 lists some of these leading programs,
showing how the use of "carrots" and "sticks" has been balanced in each
jurisdiction. They demonstrate that the "hybrid" approach can and does
work under circumstances different than those found in Montgomery
County. These programs represent only a few of the many that have
gone beyond regulation-or in some cases have tried to avoid
regulation-by investing funds in the protection of farmland. In all,
fifteen states8l and the federal government 82 have invested money in
77 All figures as of September 1999. Except where otherwise indicated, all data is from
Farmland Information Center, American Farmland Trust, Local Purchase ofAgricultural
Conservation Easement Programs (visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://farm.fic.niu.edu/fic-
ta/tafs-paceloc.html>.
78 Sonoma has three agricultural zones: land intensive/crops (density range 1:20-100 ac),
land extensive/grazing (1:60-320 ac), and diverse agriculture (1:10-60 ac). See
Telephone Interview with Maria Cipriani, Assistant General Manager, Sonoma County
Agricultural Preservation & Open Space District (Oct. 8,. 1999).
79 Acres of cropland only. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Census of Agriculture,
<http://www.nass.usda.gov/census> (visited Oct. 14, 1999).
80 What they all appear to have in common, however, are significant development
pressure that has already converted a sizable percentage of the jurisdiction's farmland; an
agriculture that is valued by the public for its productivity and/or scenic characteristics;
and a fairly large suburban population capable of generating significant PDR funding.
81 See FREEDGOOD, supra note 14, at 86-87. "PACE" is an acronym for "purchase of
agricultural conservation easements," a term synonymous with PDR.
8 Two federal programs have invested directly in farmland protection. The Agriculture
and Food Act of 1981 § 1540, 7 U.S.C. § 4201 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), authorized
interest free loans to states for easement purchases, but was run only as a pilot program in
Vermont. The Farmland Protection Program, authorized by the Federal Agricultural
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agricultural PDR programs, protecting many acres of farmland, to say
nothing of comparable programs that pay to protect natural areas, sensitive
environments, and open space. These efforts demonstrate that the public
recognizes the advantages of incentive-based approaches to the
management of growth, and that it appears willing to share the cost of
achieving "smart growth" with private landowners.
Further evidence of this public sentiment is apparent from the
November 1998 election results, when more than 150 ballot referenda
were passed, authorizing $7.5 billion in new funding for land protection,
primarily through the purchase of fee title or conservation easements. 83
The poster child of this new interest in conservation was the $1 billion
bond act successfully championed by New Jersey Governor Christine
Todd Whitman. 84 Perhaps encouraged by the political popularity of these
measures, the Clinton-Gore Administration more recently has proposed a
significant increase in federal spending for the acquisition of conservation
easements-including $55 million a year for farmland protection-as part
of its Lands Legacy proposal85 to Congress. 86
But if the public is willing to invest in "carrots" to share the cost of
conserving land and managing growth with landowners, are landowners
themselves willing to meet the public half-way by accepting the "sticks"
that offset the weaknesses of voluntary, compensatory programs? Are
private property owners willing to bear a share of the responsibility by
accepting reasonable regulations without demanding compensation for
every penny of lost profit they could earn if the use of their land were
unrestricted?
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 § 338, 16 U.S.C. § 3830 (Supp. IV 1998),
provided $35 million in matching grants to states and localities over a three year period.
It is up for congressional reauthorization as this paper is being written.
83 See PHYLLIS MEYERS, LIVABILITY AT THE BALLOT Box: STATE AND LOCAL
REFERENDA ON PARKS, CONSERVATION AND SMARTER GROWTH, ELECTION DAY 1998 1
(1999).
84 See id. at 8.
85 See Resources 2000 Act, H.R. 798/S. 446, 106th Cong. § 402 (1999). At this writing,
Congress is considering other competing conservation funding proposals. See, e.g.,
Conservation and Reinvestment Act of 1999, H.R. 701/S. 25, 106th Cong. § 202 (1999)
(authorizing the use of Outer Continental Shelf Impact Assistance Fund revenues for use
in farmland preservation).
86 See Michael Janofsky, Gore Offers Plan to Control Suburban Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1999, at A16.
1999]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
IV. THE TAKINGS ISSUE
A. Whither Private Property Owners?
Last year, American Farmland Trust commissioned a scientific,
academic poll of agricultural landowners' opinions about property rights.87
Among the questions landowners were asked was whether, to protect
farming from conflicts with neighboring uses, they preferred mandatory
zoning or compensating landowners who volunteer not to develop their
property. A surprising fifty-eight percent favored the regulatory
approach.89  This result appears to recognize the weakness of relying
entirely on voluntary incentives to achieve land use goals, and seems to
endorse regulations that serves the interest of landowners. 90
The importance of zoning to farmers was recently underscored by
the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in Bormann v. Board of
Supervisors,91 which ruled that the state's Right to Farm Law92 was an
unconstitutional taking of private property-not the property of a farmer,
but of a neighboring homeowner! 93 The Iowa Right to Farm statute, and
others like it in nearly every state, 94 attempts to insulate farmers from
liability for creating nuisances affecting neighboring homeowners who
purchased or otherwise occupied their property after the commencement
of a farming operation. It does so by allowing the defense of "coming to
the nuisance.
95
87 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 3.
88 See id. at 7.
89 See id. at 8.
90 The same survey found that a comparable majority of landowners supports regulations
to protect water quality from livestock and forestry runoff, provided that such regulations
are accompanied by incentives to help share the cost. See id. at 9-10. In contrast, only
40% of the landowners surveyed supported wetlands regulations over voluntary,
incentive-based approaches to protecting this resource. See id. at 9. Even fewer, 16%,
favored endangered species regulation. See id. The pattern that emerges is that
landowner support for regulation decreases as the perceived benefit to them becomes
more remote.
9' 584 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1998).
92 IOWA CODE § 172D.2 (1997).
9' See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 321.
9' See NEIL D. HAMILTON, A LIVESTOCK PRODUCER'S LEGAL GUIDE TO: NUISANCE,
LAND USE CONTROL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1992) (on file with author). See also
Thompson, supra note 45, at 211-13 (discussing various statutory provisions that declare
pre-existing agricultural land uses as not being a nuisance).
See Thompson, supra note 45, at 212. "Right to farm" laws have not been that
successful at protecting agriculture against the risks that arise when farmland is sold for
development. Most reported decisions under these statutes have favored homeowners,
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The Iowa court said that the law, in effect, imposes an easement
over the property of neighboring homeowners, whose involuntary
exposure to farm odors, noise, dust and drifting chemicals it likened to
being flooded by the construction of a downstream dam or being made to
tolerate low-level aircraft overflights. 96 In the court's novel and surprising
opinion, this amounted to a physical invasion of the homeowners'
property, one of the threshold tests for a taking under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
97
The Bormann decision has prompted discussion in the agricultural
community about the scope of private property rights and seems to be
causing second thoughts about the validity and value of land use
regulation. At least one prominent commentator noted that farmers who
have opposed zoning may find in the wake of Bormann that regulation is
the best, if not the only way for them to safeguard their farming operations
from the risks associated with having non-farming neighbors. How can
farmers protect themselves from litigation, as well as trespass, vandalism,
theft and other risks of economic losses, if not by regulating the number of
non-farmers in their midst?
B. A Broader Notion of "Just" Compensation?
Is the security that zoning affords farming operations
compensation enough for the limits on development imposed by this kind
of regulation? The aforementioned AFT survey of agricultural
landowners found that thirty-six percent believe that no financial
compensation is warranted for zoning that protects the "right to farm."
99
The security it provides agriculture is apparently recompense enough to
many landowners. To borrow a phrase from Justice Holmes in the
finding loopholes in the laws, well short of unconstitutionality, to reach a just result. See,
e.g., Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352 (Idaho 1995) (deciding that a cattle ranch that had
changed its method of operation was not protected by the "right to farm" law). There is,
however, some anecdotal evidence that "right to farm" laws have discouraged some
potential litigation. In retrospect, however, these laws appear to be an attempt to close
the barn door only after the cows have escaped; that is, to protect farming from
residential development after development of farmland has occurred.
96 See Bormann, 584 N.W.2d at 318-19.
9' See id. at 321. The Bormann case, thus, does not appear to affect the other standard
test for a taking, i.e., that it denies virtually all economic use of land, which is typically
invoked to challenge land use regulations. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
98 See Eye to Eye, FARM J., Nov. 1998, at 22. (remarks of Barry Flinchbaugh, Chairman
of the Commission on 21 s Century Production Agriculture).
99 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 14.
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Pennsylvania Coall°° case, these landowners seem to recognize a
"reciprocity of advantage" in such regulation.' 0
They also appear to recognize that private property often enjoys a
financial advantage conferred by the investment of public funds;
"givings,"'10 2 if you will. Another significant finding of AFT's survey was
that an additional thirty-nine percent of agricultural landowners said that
any compensation owed for restrictive zoning should be reduced to avoid
a windfall where the value of the land has been inflated at taxpayer
expense by the construction of highways. 10 3 The private gain from this
and other types of public investment can be considerable. For example,
one highway in Georgia caused nearby land values to jump from $4,000 to
$14,000 per acre. 10 4 This makes the concession by landowners that they
are not necessarily entitled to such windfalls all the more remarkable. 105
Between the recognition that regulation benefits private property,
and the concession that private land derives part of its value from public
investment, a majority of agricultural landowners seems to reject the
notion that every regulation is a taking and that government must
compensate for every penny of potential loss its actions may cause.10 6
This reflects a broader notion of "just compensation" than that which
looks only at the fair market value of land. One that encompasses the idea
that fair treatment should extend, not only to landowners, but to society at
large; one that questions whether it is right for landowners to accept the
benefits of government, but none of its burdens. One that rejects the
proposition that taxpayers should have to pay twice to achieve land use
'oo Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
o1 See id. at 415.
102 For a more complete discussion of "givings," see Edward Thompson, Jr., The
Government Giveth, ENVTL. F., March-April 1994, at 22.
103 See THOMPSON, supra note 41, at 14.
104 See J. BERGSTROM ET AL., supra note 40, at 11.
'05 The AFT survey also found that 62% of the landowners surveyed agreed that no
compensation or reduced compensation should be paid for erosion control regulations
where the value of farmland had been inflated by agricultural subsidies. See THOMPSON,
supra note 41, at 14. Such value inflation is not insignificant-one recent study found
that the capitalization of federal subsidies accounts for 10-50% of the value of
Midwestern farmland. See Charles Barnard, Measuring the Impact of Direct Government
Payments on the Value of Midwest Cropland, in, COMPETITION FOR THE LAND: A
WORKSHOP ON THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC POLICY ON THE MARKET FOR U.S. FARMLAND 265
(1997).
106 In fact, more than three-quarters of the landowners AFT surveyed who offered an
opinion on the subject (68% of the total respondent pool versus 22%) rejected legislation
that would automatically award compensation when regulation reduces property values
by a specific, fixed percentage; instead favoring an approach that takes individual facts
and circumstances into consideration. See THOMPSON, supra note 4 1, at 15.
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goals-once when government expenditures increase land values, and
again when government regulations decreases land values.
V. CONCLUSION
A broader sense of justice in the way government influences
private land use is fundamental to making "hybrid" growth management
programs work. The fundamental premise of such programs is that the
responsibility for, and cost of, achieving land use objectives must be
shared between landowners and the general public. Good faith must be
exercised by both sides in neither expecting too much from the other, nor
imposing too great a burden. Regulations must be effective, but flexible
and reasonable. Efforts to compensate landowners for lost equity must be
timely and genuine. And counterproductive government expenditures or
subsidies-the kind that encourage landowners to do what regulation
would prohibit, and that artificially inflate land values, creating an
exaggerated sense of entitlement-must be avoided. Montgomery County
and other leading jurisdictions have proved that this new paradigm can
work in the context of farmland protection. There is no reason why it
cannot also succeed to achieve other growth management or natural
resource conservation goals. The stakes are high and the current stalemate
is getting us nowhere. We can't afford not to give it a try.
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